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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS, BEWARE:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES
ABOUND FOR DEFECTIVE PRICING
Steven D. Overly*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1962, Congress enacted the Truth In Negotiations Act (Act),1
and in 1978, the Contract Disputes Act,' which together provide an ex-
cellent vehicle for resolving both government and contractor defective
pricing claims. When these acts were enacted, Congress never envisioned
the Justice Department's criminalization of the contracting process.
Over the last four years, however, allegations regarding a $7600 cof-
feemaker, a $916 nylon stool cap and a $31,000 machined metal ring
have caused members of Congress to join Pentagon auditors and Justice
Department attorneys in an effort to indict and prosecute government
contractors in the defense industry.3
As a result of such public scrutiny, Defense Department Inspector
General Joseph H. Sherick reported to Congress in 1985 that forty-five of
the top one hundred defense contractors were under criminal investiga-
tion.4 The Defense Procurement Fraud Unit, created by the Justice De-
partment in August 1982, claims its efforts have resulted in thirty-one
convictions.' According to the Inspector General's semiannual report of
audit and investigative activities, during the six-month period ending
September 30, 1986, 222 contractors were debarred and 246 contractors
were suspended. In addition, there were 401 indictments and 525 convic-
* Senior Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace,
Martin Marietta Corporation. B.A. 1979, Gettysburg College; M.P.A. 1982, Pennsylvania
State University; J.D. 1982, Stetson University College of Law; LL.M. 1984, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center.
1. Pub. L. No. 87-653, 76 Stat. 528 (1962) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
10 U.S.C.).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-653, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5, 28, 31 & 41 U.S.C.).
3. Whistle-Blower Takes Aim at Price Gouging, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 15, 1985, at
B-1.
4. Pentagon Camouflages Data: Statistics Suggest Better Performance than Facts War-
rant, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 18, 1985, at A-1.
5. How Deep? Commitment is Questioned, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 19, 1985, at A-
1; Arms Costs: A Wasteland? System Fails Despite Layers of Control, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Dec. 15, 1985, at A-1.
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tions reported. Fines, forfeitures, recoveries and civil settlements
amounted to $71.7 million for the period.6
On March 29, 1984, Robert W. Ogren, Chief of the Fraud Section
(Criminal Division), identified the Justice Department's principal con-
cerns in the defense procurement fraud area: mischarging of labor costs,
product substitution, defective pricing, bid rigging and corruption of pro-
curement officers. 7 This Article will focus on the area of defective pric-
ing, one of the most likely areas for both civil and criminal investigations
into allegations of procurement fraud.
II. THE TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT
The Truth In Negotiations Act, 8 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder,9 require contractors to submit cost or pricing data, to certify
that such data is accurate, complete and current, 10 and to agree to in-
clude a price reduction clause in each contract which requires such a
certificate." Specifically, the law requires contractors to submit certified
cost or pricing data in the following circumstances:
(A) before the award of any prime contract under this chap-
ter... entered into after using procedures other than sealed-bid
procedures, if the price is expected to exceed $100,000;
(B) before the pricing of any contract change or modification
if the price adjustment is expected to exceed $100,000, or such
lesser amount as may be prescribed by the head of the agency;
(C) before the award of a subcontract at any tier, when the
prime contractor and each higher tier subcontractor have been
required to furnish such a certificate, if the price of such sub-
contract is expected to exceed $100,000; or
(D) before the pricing of any contract change or modification
to a subcontract covered by clause (C), if the price adjustment
is expected to exceed $100,000, or such lesser amount as may
be prescribed by the head of the agency.2
6. 46 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 1007 (Dec. 15, 1986).
7. Address by Robert W. Ogren, Chief of the Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, at the Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 29, 1984).
8. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (Supp. 1985).
9. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-2(a)(1) (1985).
10. Id. § 15.804-2. Submission and certification of cost or pricing data is not required,
however, if the price is based on adequate price competition, based on established catalog or
market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general public, or set by
law or regulation. Id. § 15.804.3(a).
11. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f)(1) (Supp. 1985); see also FAR § 15.804-2.
12. See FAR § 15.804-8(a) & (b).
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The following discussion on the Truth In Negotiations Act will outline
the government's procedures for obtaining "cost or pricing data" and the
possible civil consequences for a contractor's failure to properly submit
such data.
A. Standard Form 1411
1. Generally
Initially, the government requires contractors to acknowledge on
Form 1411 that their proposal "reflects [their] best estimates and/or ac-
tual costs as of this date."' 3 The instructions to Form 1411 require the
submission of cost or pricing data and any information reasonably re-
quired to explain the offeror's estimating process. 14 This includes both
"[the judgmental factors applied and the mathematical or other methods
used in the estimate, including those used in projecting from known
data" and "[t]he nature and amount of any contingencies included in the
proposed price.""
In addition to factual cost or pricing data, Form 1411 requires dis-
closure of any cost estimates included in a contractor's proposal that are
based on judgments.' 6 Such disclosure is designed to ensure that the gov-
ernment is provided sufficient detail to evaluate a proposal. 7 While the
Form 1411 instructions define the term "submittal" only with regard to
cost or pricing data, they arguably allow "submittal" of the contractor's
estimating processes either by actual submission to the contracting officer
or by specific identification in the proposal.
Form 1411 requires costs to be broken down for each contract line
item, with supporting information suitable for detailed analysis. While
the government has a penchant for requiring that this pricing informa-
tion be consistent with the contractor's cost accounting system, the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has tended to be
more liberal. In Texas Instruments, Inc., 8 the ASBCA agreed with the
13. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, STANDARD FORM 1411, CONTRACT PRICING
PROPOSAL COVER SHEET (1984). By signing Standard Form 1411, the contractor attests that
the form is completed in accordance with its instructions.
Form 1411 was promulgated as part of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).
When the FAR replaced the Defense Acquisition Regulations, Form 1411 replaced DD Form
633.
14. Instruction No. 2, Table 15-2: Instructions for Submission of A Contract Pricing Pro-
posal, FAR § 15.804-6 (1986).
15. Id.
16. See Levinson Steel Co., 73-2 B.C.A. (CCII) 110,116, at 47,547 (1973).
17. Muncie Gear Works, Inc., 75-2 B.C.A. (CCI) 11,380, at 54,169 (1975).
18. 79-1 B.C.A. (CCII) % 13,800, aff'd on motion for reconsideration, 79-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
14,184 (1979).
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contractor's decision to use data, in support of its proposal, that was ac-
cumulated in a manner contrary to the contractor's customary cost ac-
counting practices. The government argued that Cost Accounting
Standard (CAS) 401 required estimating cost practices used in pricing to
be consistent with cost accounting practices used in accumulating and
reporting costs. However, the ASBCA upheld the contractor's use of
such data, since it had clearly indicated the process and method by which
it derived the numbers on the supplemental schedule to its proposal.1 9
2. Liability for Misuse
At least two cases have dealt with government allegations that a
contractor misused Department of Defense (DD) Form 633, the prede-
cessor of Form 1411, to defraud the government. The government pre-
vailed in both instances. In United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp. ,20 a
civil fraud case, the court found the contractor's submission of DD Form
633 false and misleading because: (1) the estimated costs certified on the
form were not based on the company's books and records; (2) the con-
tractor's breakdown on the form of lump sum cost figures was artificial
and designed to hide an increase in the estimated cost figures; and (3) the
contractor made oral representations that an 11% loss had been sus-
tained on an earlier contract involving identical goods when, in fact, its
books and records revealed a 6.7% profit on the earlier contract.2 The
court not only held that the contractor acted intentionally, but also
found that it negligently made misrepresentations of material fact on
which the government relied.22 Thus, the contractor was found to have
violated the False Claims Act 23 and to have perpetrated common-law
fraud based upon statements contained in its DD Form 633.24
In United States v. White,25 a criminal fraud case, the court affirmed
the contractor's convictions under 18 U.S.C. sections 287, 371 and
1001.26 There, the contractor misrepresented that it performed certain
work under the contract (actually performed by another company), al-
tered time cards to support fictional labor data contained in its proposal
and claimed that the numbers used pertaining to labor data were esti-
19. Id. at 67,606, 67,619-20.
20. 316 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 447 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.
1971).
21. Id. at 966.
22. Id. at 974.
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1983).
24. Foster, 316 F. Supp. at 974.
25. 765 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1985).
26. Id. at 1482.
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mates derived from actual cost experience.27 In representing the latter,
the contractor omitted the formula that it had used to arrive at the re-
sulting "estimate" so as to hide the underlying factual data supporting
it.28 It did this despite earlier statements during negotiations that the
numbers in the proposal were derived from "real facts."29
In reaching a decision, the White court noted three things which
distinguished this case from those in which defendants had escaped crim-
inal liability. First, the contractor had not made affirmative representa-
tions that could reasonably be interpreted as true. Rather, it omitted
facts supporting its labor figures even though it had underlying data with
which to do so. This was contrary to the specific instructions accompa-
nying Department of Defense Form 633 that called for price breakdowns
and disclosure of the formulas and factors used to derive the submitted
numbers.30
Second, the White court contrasted the contractor's behavior with
that of the defendant in Maxwell v. United States.31 In Maxwell, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the contractor had
exhibited "forthright" behavior because it repeatedly and honestly in-
formed the government that it had no numbers to support its estimate,
which was in fact "pulled from thin air."3 2 In contrast, the White court
characterized the contractor's behavior as "deceitful." The court per-
ceived that by initially telling the government that it used actual hours
and then later contending that the numbers were mere estimates with no
factual support, by altering time cards, and by falsely attributing more
work to the subcontractor than was actually performed, the contractor's
behavior was nothing less than "a willful attempt to fleece the system." 
3
Finally, the White court noted that even if the estimates were based
on nothing more than mathematical formulas, the contractor had a duty
to show that they reasonably reflected incurred costs. Failure to do so
evidenced a "reckless disregard of the truth, with a conscious purpose to
avoid learning the truth," sufficient to show that a "false statement was
made knowingly or willfully."
34
27. Id. at 1473-78.
28. Id. at 1481-82.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1479.
31. 277 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1960).
32. Id. at 509.
33. White, 765 F.2d at 1480-81.
34. Id. at 1481-82.
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B. Cost Or Pricing Data
1. Definition
The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) define "cost or pricing
data" as:
[A]ll facts as of the time of price agreement that prudent buyers
and sellers would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations
significantly. Cost or pricing data are factual, not judgmental,
and are therefore verifiable. While they do not indicate the ac-
curacy of the prospective contractor's judgment about esti-
mated future costs or projections, they do include the data
forming the basis for that judgment. Cost or pricing data are
more than historical accounting data; they are all the facts that
can be reasonably expected to contribute to the soundness of
estimates of future costs and to the validity of determinations of
costs already incurred. They also include such factors as
(a) vendor quotations; (b) nonrecurring costs; (c) information
on changes in production methods and in production or
purchasing volume; (d) data supporting projections of business
prospects and objectives and related operations costs; (e) unit-
cost trends such as those associated with labor efficiency;
(f) make-or-buy decisions; (g) estimated resources to attain
business goals; and (h) information on management decisions
that could have a significant bearing on costs."
Few cases rely on the precise language defining cost or pricing data
found in the regulations. Instead, they remove and use only those por-
tions that are helpful. Although the regulations define cost or pricing
data as "all facts existing up to the time of agreement on price which
prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to have a significant
effect on price negotiations,"36 case law dwells on the prudent buyer
rather than on the prudent seller. The prudent buyer standard has been
interpreted to include all data that might affect the price or that might
serve to establish future costs or the validity of costs already incurred.
37
Thus, if an estimate (e.g., of future business or of future labor rates) is
used in a price proposal, the underlying facts upon which the estimate is
based must be disclosed to the buyer.38 Those underlying facts represent
35. FAR § 15.801.
36. Id.
37. Singer Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 905, 918 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (per curiam); Cutler-
Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1306, 1314-15 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Norris Indus., Inc.,
ASBCA No. 15,442, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) V 10,482, at 49,571 (1974).
38. Baldwin Elecs., Inc., ASBCA No. 20,717, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 12,199, at 58,739
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cost or pricing data. Even estimates derived from cost data must be dis-
closed when they can be verified against that data and are information
that a prudent buyer would expect to significantly affect price negotia-
tions.39 It has been held that an estimate is only a judgment if there is no
contrary factual data on which the contractor could revise his estimate.'
Otherwise, it is a fact and must be disclosed as cost or pricing data.41
The ASBCA has employed a "reasonableness" standard to deter-
mine whether items constitute cost or pricing data under the above defi-
nition.42 Using that standard, the seller must be permitted to draw a line
somewhere in determining whether information constitutes cost or pric-
ing data and whether it should be disclosed. Accordingly, the ASBCA
has held that a contractor has failed to disclose only if it did so "for no
good reason, or for reasons with which a prudent buyer would reason-
ably disagree."43
For example, in TRA Architecture Engineering/R, James Dersham,
AIA Architects (JV),4 the ASBCA approved the contractor's decision to
deliberately ignore data for the three most recent years in favor of older
data.45 The contractor claimed that the more recent data was "not
meaningful" because it included figures reflective of activities in which
the company did not normally engage.46 The ASBCA lauded the con-
tractor's decision and stated that the more recent statistics would have
distorted the price, thus it was appropriate to use the "meaningful"
data.47
2. Judgment versus fact
Although the definition of "cost or pricing" data emphasizes that it
is comprised of verifiable facts rather than judgments, it leaves the gov-
ernment room to construe as verifiable fact information which in some
instances may not fall clearly within the meaning of that term. There is
(1976); Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 20,717, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH)7 12,121, at 58,227
(1976).
39. Lambert Eng'g Co., ASBCA No. 13,338, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCII) 1 7663, at 35,576 (1969).
40. See Rogerson Aircraft Controls, ASBCA No. 27,954, 85-1 B.C.A. (CCH) % 17,725, at
88,491 (1984).
41. Id.
42. See Hardie-Tynes, ASBCA No. 20,717, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH) at 58,227; Plessey Indus.,
Inc., ASBCA No. 16,720, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,603, at 50,278 (1974); Luzon Stevedoring
Corp., ASBCA No. 14851, 71-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 8745, at 40,604 (1971).
43. Plessey, ASBCA No. 16,720, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 110,603, at 50,278 (1974).
44. ASBCA Nos. 28,525, 28,980, 84-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 17,152 (1984).
45. Id. at 85,462.
46. Id. at 85,466-67.
47. Id. at 85,467.
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considerable support for the proposition that all data that might in any
way affect the price negotiations must be disclosed.48 The contractor is
then free, after disclosure, to argue that the data is irrelevant to price
determination. It seems apparent, however, that the contractor cannot
unilaterally decide what is not pertinent and therefore refuse to disclose
it.49 Otherwise, if the contractor could pick and choose which data it
wishes to disclose, the Act's purpose would be defeated.
In Aerojet-General Corp.,50 the ASBCA determined that a contrac-
tor whose engineering studies and analyses revealed its subcontractor's
bid to be grossly overstated had a duty to disclose those studies and anal-
yses to the government as cost or pricing data. The ASBCA held that
the "studies" were facts even though there were elements of judgment
involved, basing its decision on the premise that both the underlying data
and the "studies" themselves were verifiable."
C. Accurate, Complete and Current
The Act requires that each contractor or subcontractor "shall be
required to submit cost or pricing data.., and shall be required to certify
that, to the best of such contractor's or subcontractor's knowledge and
belief, the cost or pricing data submitted was accurate, complete and cur-
rent." 2 Use of inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent data when there is
more accurate,53 complete54 and current55 data "practically available" is
48. A contractor must keep in mind that, while the Truth In Negotiations Act only re-
quires disclosure of cost or pricing data, Form 1411 also requires disclosure of the judgmental
factors applied in arriving at cost estimates. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17. More-
over, if a contractor fails to disclose certain information that is later found to constitute cost or
pricing information, he may find himself subject to the civil and criminal penalties outlined
herein.
49. Singer Co., 576 F.2d at 918; Bell & Howell Co., ASBCA No. 11,999, 68-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 6993, at 32,347 (1968) (holding that data available but not used in a price bid must be
disclosed, but that the contractor is free to explain the reason for nonuse).
. 50. ASBCA No. 12,264, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) % 7664, at 35,577 (1969), modified in part, 70-
1 B.C.A. (CCH) 8140, at 37,811 (1970).
51. Id. at 35,582-84.
52. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f)(1) (1986); see also FAR §§ 15.804-2, -3.
53. Something is generally considered to be "accurate" when it is "free from error and
defect," or when it is "substantially accurate and not distorted ...." Hoye v. Schaefer, 148
N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1957), aff'd, 109 Ohio App. 489, 157 N.E.2d 140 (1959). See
also Lewis v. Vallis, 356 Mass. 662, 666, 255 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1970).
54. While there are many definitions of the word "complete," those definitions all agree in
essence with that found in Black's Law Dictionary: "Full; entire; including every item or
element of the thing spoken of, without omissions or deficiencies; ... [p]erfect; consummate;
not lacking in any element or particular." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (5th ed. 1979).
55. "Current" is defined as "belonging to the time actually passing; new, present, most
recent." Kozak v. Retirement Bd. of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 99 Ill. App. 3d
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improper." However, if the most current information is not available
and there are other "reasonable and responsible data ... and a good
reason for preferring them,... the contractor may choose to use such...
data."
57
D. Submittal of Cost or Pricing Data
In order to comply with the Act, the contractor must certify that all
of the cost or pricing data contained in its proposal or submitted in sup-
port of its proposal is accurate, complete and current.58 As a result, the
contractor has a continuing obligation to update the cost or pricing data
contained in his proposal until a final agreement on contract price is
reached.59 . Such certification, however, applies only to the factual data
submitted to the government and does not constitute a representation as
to the accuracy of the contractor's judgment on the estimate of future
costs or projections.6 °
For data to be properly submitted to the government, it must either
1015, 1018, 425 N.E.2d 1371, 1373 (1981) (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unabridged ed. 1966)), aff'd, 447 N.E.2d 394 (Ill. 1983). However,
"[t]he word 'current', when used as an adjective, has many meanings, and definition depends
largely on [the] word which it modifies, or [the] subject matter with which it is associated."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 345. When, as in our context, the word "cur-
rent" deals with subject matter that must also be "complete," it can mean only such material
or data that is both complete and current. Otherwise, the two words are contradictory.
56. Singer Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 905, 920 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (per curiam); Conrac
Corp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 994, 998 (Ct. Cl. 1977); M-R-S Mfg. Co. v. United States, 492
F.2d 835, 843 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
57. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., ASBCA No. 14,851, 71-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 8745, at 40,604
(1971).
58. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (Supp. 1985); S.T. Research Corp., ASBCA No. 29,070, 84-3
B.C.A. (CCH) 17,568, at 87,547 (1984). The actual certification language is as follows:
This is to certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing
data (as defined in section 15.801 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and
required under FAR subsection 15.804-2) submitted, either actually or by specific
identification in writing, to the contracting officer or to the contracting officer's rep-
resentative in support of [identify the proposal, quotation, request for price adjust-
ment, or other submission involved, giving the appropriate identifying number] are
accurate, complete, and current as of [insert the day, month, and year when price
negotiations were concluded and the contract price was agreed to]. This certification
includes the cost or pricing data supporting any advance agreements and forward
pricing rate agreements between the offeror and the Government that are part of the
proposal.
FAR § 15.804-4(a).
59. See Lambert Eng'g Co., ASBCA No. 13,338, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 17663, at 35,575
(1969).
60. FAR § 15.804-4(b). See M-R-S Mfg. Co. v. United States, 492 F.2d 835, 838 n.3, 840
(Ct. Cl. 1974); Rogerson Aircraft Controls, ASBCA No. 27,954, 85-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 117,725
(1984); Luzon Stevedoring Corp., ASBCA No. 15,606, 71-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 8,745 (1971);
Lambert, ASBCA No. 13,338, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 7,663 (1969).
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be delivered physically to the government or be made available to the
government coupled with the disclosure of its significance to the particu-
lar contract. 1 If the government was specifically advised during negotia-
tions that the required information was available and pertinent to the
subject negotiations, the government cannot later contend that such in-
formation was not disclosed.62 In this regard, later disclosures can ar-
guably be construed as informal supplementation of the contractor's
proposal. The rationale being that, in a dispute over nondisclosure, the
government has the ultimate burden of proving that it was not advised of
relevant information and that it lacked knowledge of the allegedly undis-
closed information.6" Similarly, as long as disclosure is or was made, in
some form, to the "prenegotiation auditor, the [Defense Contract Admin-
istrative Service Region] DCASR price analyst, or other appropriate gov-
ernment personnel," the government will be unable to prove
nondisclosure if changes occur that affect cost between the time the pro-
posal is submitted and the final agreement on price."
E. Contract Price Adjustment
1. Generally
Price increases resulting from inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent
cost or pricing data entitle the government to a "price adjustment, in-
cluding profit or fee, of any significant amount by which the price was
increased because of the defective data."6 The government is entitled to
a price adjustment for defects in cost or pricing data submitted by either
a prime contractor or subcontractor.
In M-R-S Manufacturing Co. v. United States,6 6 the contractor ar-
gued that since it had submitted no data in support of its price proposal,
61. M-R-SMfg. Co., 492 F.2d at 842-43; Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., ASBCA No. 13,622,
70-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 8387, at 38,999, aff'd, 479 F.2d 1342 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (1970); Defense
Elec., Inc., ASBCA No. 11,127, 66-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 5604, at 26,202 (1966); American Bosch
Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10,305, 65-2 B.C.A. (CCH) % 5280 (1965). Cf. Singer Co. v. United
States, 576 F.2d 905, 914-16 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (requiring the contractor to physically deliver the
data and to make known its significance).
62. Conrac Corp., ASBCA No. 19,507, 78-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,985, at 63,295 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Whittaker Corp., ASBCA No. 17,267, 74-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 10,938, at 52,078 (1974)
(emphasis added).
65. FAR § 15.804-7(b); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f)(2) (1986). However, in Aerojet-Gen-
eral Corp., ASBCA No. 12,873, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 7585 (1969), and Bell & Howell Co.,
ASBCA No. 11,999, 68-1 B.C.A. (CCH) % 6993 (1968), the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA) arrived at a compromise price adjustment.
66. ASBCA No. 14,825, 71-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 8821 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 835 (Ct. Cl.
1974).
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the government was not entitled to a price reduction. The contractor
had executed a certificate, however, and the contract contained a price
reduction clause. The Court of Claims rejected the contractor's argu-
ment, stating that:
The second flaw in the plaintiff's argument concerns its
assertion that data must be submitted in support of a proposal
before the Defective Pricing Clause allows a price reduction.
The plaintiff interprets the Defective Pricing Clause and the
Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data so as to sanction his
argument. Such an interpretation might have merit if only con-
tractual provisions, and not a statutory directive, were in-
volved. However, since the clause and the certificate exist
pursuant to the directions of the Truth in Negotiations Act, 10
U.S.C. § 2306(f), the scope of these items turns on the scope of
the Act.
As this court has said on several occasions, the Truth in
Negotiations Act imposes a duty on Government contractors to
completely disclose cost and pricing information .... There-
fore, even if, as the plaintiff asserts, no data were submitted "in
support" of the proposal... , the plaintiff still did not meet the
requirements imposed by the Act.67
If the government establishes that it is entitled to a contract price
adjustment as a result of defective pricing, the contractor is entitled to
offset against any such overstatement the amount of any understatements
it later finds it made on the same contract.68 Specifically, the FAR pro-
vides that:
In arriving at a price adjustment under the [contract] clause,
the contracting officer shall consider-
(1) The time by which the cost or pricing data became
reasonably available to the contractor;
(2) The extent to which the Government relied upon the
defective data; and
(3) Any understated cost or pricing data submitted in
support of price negotiations, up to the amount of the Govern-
ment's claim for overstated pricing data arising out of the same
pricing action (for example, the initial pricing of the same con-
67. M.R.S. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 492 F.2d 835, 840-41 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
68. FAR § 15.804-7(b)(3); see also Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1306,
1312 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Muncie Gear Works, Inc., ASBCA No. 18,184, 75-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
11,380, at 54,181-82 (1975).
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tract or the pricing of the same change order). Such offsets
need not be in the same cost groupings (e.g., material, direct
labor, or indirect costs).
69
Offsets are permissible up to the amount asserted as defective pricing,
even though the contract has been administratively closed.70
The Defense Procurement Improvement Act,71 contained in the
Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act of 1986,72 provides
that the contractor will be liable for interest on any contract overpay-
ment resulting from his submission of inaccurate, incomplete, or noncur-
rent cost or pricing data. 3 In addition, if the contractor knowingly
submits such data, the government can impose a separate civil penalty in
the amount of the contract overpayment. 74 These new statutory provi-
sions have been recodified in the new Truth In Negotiations Act provi-
sions added by the DOD Authorization Act of 1986.7s
2. Burden of proof
In defective pricing cases, the government has the burden of show-
ing "that more accurate, complete and current cost and pricing data
[was] reasonably available to [the contractor] on the date of certifica-
tion. ''7 6 To demonstrate that "more accurate, complete and current cost
and pricing data" existed, the government must establish a nexus "be-
tween the raw data and how it could reasonably be expected to contrib-
ute to sound estimates of future costs and how prudent buyers and sellers
would reasonably expect its disclosure to have a significant effect on price
negotiations.""
Next, the government must establish a nexus between the alleged
defective pricing data and a resulting significant overstatement of con-
tract price. If the government would not have relied on information that
was withheld or did not rely on misinformation that was provided, it is
not entitled to a contract price adjustment since there was no overstate-
69. FAR § 15.804-7(b).
70. See 1A McBRIDE, WACHTEL & TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 7.70[8] (rev.
1985).
71. Pub. L. No. 99-145, tit. 9, 99 Stat. 583, 682 (1986).
72. Pub. L. No. 99-145, 99 Stat. 583 (1986).
73. Pub. L. No. 99-145, tit. 9, § 934.
74. Id. § 952.
75. Id.; 10 U.S.C. § 2306a(e).
76. See Central Navigation & Trading Co., S.A., ASBCA No. 23,946, 82-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
116,074, at 79,746 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing LTV Electrosystems, Inc., ASBCA No.
16,802, 73-1 B.C.A. (CCH) % 9957, at 46,708) (1973).
77. Boeing Co., ASBCA No. 20,875, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 118,351, at 92,032 (1985).
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ment of contract price.78 Although there is a presumption that defective
data will cause an increase in the negotiated price, the presumption is
rebutted when the government demonstrates that it knew the proposal
was based on other than the most accurate, complete or current data.7 9
Furthermore, when the contractor has provided erroneous data but dis-
closes such error, the government assumes the risk of overpayment if it
relies on that data.8 °
Regarding the government's burden of proof, the ASBCA has held
that the government is not automatically entitled to a price reduction
once an overstatement has been established. 1 Specifically, in American
Machine & Foundry Co., 8 2 the ASBCA stated that:
It is crystal clear that the statute does not expressly provide for
an automatic price reduction measured by the amount of any
overstatement of the cost of a component part of the end item,
plus the percentages that the Government chooses to use for
G&A [General & Administrative expenses] and profit ...
Rather, the remedy clearly envisaged by the statute where an
overstatement in the cost of a component part has been estab-
lished is an adjustment in the contract price of the end item "to
exclude any significant sums by which it may be determined...
that such price was increased because the contractor or any
subcontractor ... furnished cost or pricing data which... was
inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent." In other words, the
statute, rather than requiring an automatic price reduction in
the end item equal to the amount of the dollar and cents over-
statement of a component part, plus G&A and profit, as advo-
cated by the Government, requires that first, as a sine qua non,
there exist a causal connection between any inaccurate, incom-
plete or noncurrent data with respect to a component part, on
the one hand, and any increase of the contract price of the end
item, on the other hand. Further, even if the existence of such
a causal relationship is established, the statute requires that,
before a price reduction may be effected, the "significant sums
78. See Muncie, ASBCA No. 18,184, 75-2 B.C.A. (CCH) at 54,173-74; American Mach. &
Foundry Co., ASBCA No. 15,037, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCII) 1 10,409, at 49,174-75 (1973); Levinson
Steel Co., ASBCA No. 16,520, 73-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 110,116, at 47,548 (1973).
79. Rogerson Aircraft Controls, ASBCA No. 27,954, 85-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 17,725, at
88,491 (1984).
80. McDonnell Douglas Corp., ASBCA No. 12,786, 69-2 B.C.A. (CCH) % 7897, at 36,734
(1969).
81. American Mach., ASBCA No. 15,037, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCH) q 10,409, at 49,174-75.
82. ASBCA No. 15,037, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCII) 10,409 (1973).
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by which... such price [for the end item] was increased be-
cause the contractor or any subcontractor... furnished cost or
pricing data [with respect to a component part] which.., was
inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent" must be determined, be-
cause such "significant sums," and no other, may be excluded
from the contract price for the end item because of the defective
pricing data furnished with respect to the component part.83
After the government has satisfied its burden of proof, a rebuttable
presumption arises that the natural and probable consequence of such
nondisclosure is an overstated negotiated contract price.84 The contrac-
tor now has the "burden of persuasion" that such nondisclosure did not
result in an overstated price.8 5
3. Waiver and estoppel
The government and its agents cannot waive the statutory obliga-
tions and duties imposed by the Act.8 6 Estoppel, on the other hand, may
apply against the government.8 7 The requirements for estoppel, how-
ever, are stringent and can seldom be met. First, the government must
have knowledge of that which was not disclosed. Second, the govern-
ment must intend or the contractor must believe that the government
intends that its conduct be acted upon. Third, the contractor must be
ignorant of the true facts. Finally, the contractor must have relied on the
government's conduct to its detriment.88 Estoppel by acquiescence may
also be applied against the government if it knew that the contractor's
83. Id.
84. See Aerojet-General, ASBCA No. 12,264, 70-1 B.C.A. (CCH) % 8140; American Bosch
Anna Corp., ASBCA No. 10,305, 65-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 15280 (1965); see also FAR § 15,804-7.
85. See Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., ASBCA No. 13,622, 70-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 8387
(1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1342 (Ct. CI. 1973); see also Lear Siegler, Inc., ASBCA No. 20,040, 78-
1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 13,110 (1978); Muncie, ASBCA No. 18,184, 75-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 111,380;
Norris Indus., Inc., ASBCA No. 15,442, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCII) 1 10,482 (1974); American
Mach., ASBCA No. 15,037, 74-1 B.C.A. (CCII) % 10,409; Levinson Steel, ASBCA No. 16,520,
73-2 B.C.A. (CC-) 1 10,116; Luzon Stevedoring Corp., ASBCA No. 14,851, 71-1 B.C.A.
(CCII) 1 8745 (1971); McDonnell Douglas, ASBCA No. 12,786, 69-2 B.C.A. (CCII) % 7897;
Lambert Eng'g Co., ASBCA No. 13,338, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) % 7663 (1969); FMC Corp.,
ASBCA Nos. 10,095 & 11,113, 66-1 B.C.A. (CCII) % 5483 (1966).
86. See Singer Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 905, 917 (Ct. CI. 1978); M-R-S Mfg. Co.,
492 F.2d at 841; ReCon Paving, Inc., ASBCA No. 27,836, 83-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 16,658, at
82,834 (1983); Beech Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 25,338, 83-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 16,532, at
82,182-83 (1983); Boeing Co., ASBCA No. 20,875, 82-1 B.C.A. (CCH), 15,508, at 76,917
(1981).
87. See Emeco Indus. v. United States, 485 F.2d 652 (Ct. CI. 1973) (government estopped
from denying existence of a contract); Manloading & Management Assocs. v. United States,
461 F.2d 1299, 1303 (Ct. C1. 1972) (oral advice at bidders' conference estopped government).
88. Singer Co., 576 F.2d at 917.
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interpretation of the contract terms was at variance with its own but ex-
pressed no disagreement.8 9
III. GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO COST OR PRICING DATA
The Truth In Negotiations Act authorizes both pre-award and post-
award audits, providing that:
For the purpose of evaluating the accuracy, completeness, and
currency of cost or pricing data required to be submitted by
this subsection, any authorized representative of the head of the
agency who is an employee of the United States Government
shall have the right, until the expiration of three years after
final payment under the contract or subcontract, to examine all
books, records, documents, and other data of the contractor or
subcontractor related to the proposal for the contract, the dis-
cussions conducted on the proposal, pricing, or performance of
the contract or subcontract.90
Further, 10 U.S.C. section 2313(b) and 41 U.S.C. section 254(c), which
authorize post-award audits, provide similar authority for the Comptrol-
ler General to audit sealed-bid and negotiated procurements. Cases in-
terpreting these statutes have given the government very broad access to
examine any records the contractor has pertaining to the contract.91
The regulations and forms promulgated by the Department of De-
fense relating to defense contracts have broadened the government's ac-
cess to contractors' books and records. For example, Form 1411,
pertaining to the pre-award contract pricing proposal stage, grants to the
contracting officer or his authorized representative "the right to examine
those books, records, documents, and other supporting data that will per-
mit adequate evaluation of the proposed price."92 Department of De-
fense Form 633-5,91 which is used for change orders to contract pricing
89. American Elec., Inc., ASBCA No. 16,635, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCII) 12,151, at 58,478-79
(1976).
90. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f)(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
91. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 754 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983);
Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam), aff'd, 460 U.S. 824
(1983); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
988 (1968).
92. Instruction No. 5, Table 15-2: Instructions for Submission of A Contract Pricing Pro-
posal, FAR § 15.804-6 (1986).
93. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, DD FORM 633-5, CONTRACT PRICING PRO-
POSAL (CHANGE ORDERS) (1968).
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proposals, and Form 1412, 91 which governs claims for exemption from
submission of certified cost or pricing data, authorize similar access for
the purpose of verifying cost or pricing data and for verifying the legiti-
macy of the claim for exemption. Thus, both statutes and regulations
obligate the contractor to allow the government access to all records and
documentation pertaining to the contract.
95
According to the regulations, field pricing reports are to be used to
give the contracting officer "a detailed analysis of the proposal, for use in
contract negotiations." 96 In this regard, the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) is responsible for conducting reviews of the contrac-
tor's estimating systems or methods. Among the items to be considered
when auditing a contractor's estimating system are the procedures fol-
lowed in developing estimates, the source of data used in developing esti-
mates, the means of assuring that the data is accurate, complete and
current, and the documentation developed and maintained by the con-
tractor to support these estimates.97 To facilitate this process, the FAR
provides that the auditor shall have general access to the contractor's
books and financial records.
98
If the auditor's efforts to properly price a proposal are thwarted by
the contractor, the auditor is required to "promptly report to the con-
tracting officer any denial of access to records or to cost or pricing data
considered essential to the preparation of a satisfactory audit report." 99
Moreover, if the auditor believes that the contractor's estimating meth-
ods or accounting system are "inadequate to support the proposal or to
permit satisfactory administration of the contract contemplated," he
must state these beliefs in his audit report."° The regulations also pro-
vide that if the contractor refuses to provide the necessary cost or pricing
data, the contracting officer is to withhold the award or price adjustment
and refer the contract action to higher authority.101
94. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, STANDARD FORM 1412, CLAIM FOR EXEMP-
TION FROM SUBMISSION OF CERTIFIED COST OR PRICING DATA (1984).
95. It must be kept in mind that access and submission are separate and distinct problems.
An adequate submission is generally not accomplished by merely giving the government access
to all of the contractor's data. See Kisco Co., ASBCA No. 18,432, 76-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
112,147 (1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp., ASBCA No. 12,786, 69-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 7897
(1969); Aerojet-General Corp., ASBCA No. 12,873, 69-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 7585 (1969); Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 10,453, 67-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 6356 (1967), aff'd, 432 F.2d
801 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
96. FAR § 15.805-5(a)(2).
97. See id. § 15.812(c).
98. Id. § 15.805-5(d).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 15.805-5(e)(7).
101. Id. § 15.804-6(e).
DEFECTIVE PRICING PENALTIES
IV. DEFECTIVE PRICING AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Criminal prosecution for procurement fraud has largely been ac-
complished over the years through the expanding judicial interpretation
of traditional criminal statutes. The primary statutes governing false
statements, 10 2 false claims, 10 3 conspiracy,"° mail and wire fraud, 105 and
aiding and abetting,106 remain essentially unchanged in statutory lan-
guage, yet they provide flexible vehicles for prosecution of procurement
fraud.
A. False Statements
The most common vehicle used by the government in prosecuting
procurement fraud is 18 U.S.C. section 1001 (False Statements). Its ele-
ments are generally the easiest to prove of any of the possible criminal
statutes. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. section 1001 provides as follows:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any de-
partment or agency of the United States knowingly and will-
fully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme or
device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudu-
lent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
0 7
It is well established that this section encompasses three distinct criminal
offenses: (1) falsifying, concealing, or covering up a material fact by any
trick, scheme or device; (2) making false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations; and (3) making or using any false document or
writing.
10 8
The offense of false representation requires the government to prove
that: (1) the defendant made a statement; (2) the defendant knew the
statement was false, fictitious or fraudulent; (3) the statement was made
knowingly and willfully; (4) the statement was within the jurisdiction of
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
103. Id. §§ 286-87.
104. Id. § 371.
105. Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
106. Id. § 2.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
108. See United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v.
Diogo, 320 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1963).
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a federal agency; and (5) the statement was material.10 9 Although sec-
tion 1001 does not specifically proscribe omissions, the act of leaving a
blank or failing to provide information would be within the statute if
such action amounted to a false representation.' 10
The first issue to be considered is whether the statement (e.g., certifi-
cation of cost or pricing data) was in fact false since, if it were true, no
liability would arise under section 1001. Indeed, a court could determine
as a matter of law that a representation was not false and thus dispose of
a case on a motion for judgment of acquittal. A statement that on its
face is not false cannot support an indictment."1
Second, the statement must have been "within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency."' 12 The term "jurisdiction" has been broadly
construed to mean the power to exercise authority in a particular situa-
tion, so that the statute applies to the authorized functions of an agency
or department but not to matters peripheral to the business of that
body.I 3 Further, the term "department" applies to the executive, legisla-
tive and judicial branches of government.1 14 This element of the offense,
however, does not require that the statement actually be submitted to the
government."I5 In fact, a statement that is never submitted to the govern-
ment but is made in the contractor's records, which may be subject to
government inspection, is sufficient." 16
109. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 675-76; see also United States v. Seay, 718 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 190 (6th Cir.
1983); United States v. Jackson, 714 F.2d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Montemayor, 712 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1180
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Glazer, 532 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 844 (1976). Unlike common-law
"fraud," under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 the government need not prove that it relied on the defend-
ants statements in order to gain a conviction. However, reliance may be a significant consider-
ation to the Justice Department in determining whether to seek an indictment and subsequent
criminal prosecution. Moreover, the effect of governmental nonreliance may be persuasive to a
jury in a criminal trial proceeding.
110. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 676; United States v. McCarthy, 422 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1970).
111. United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1978).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
113. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984); United States v. Balk, 706
F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1983).
114. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955).
115. United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1980). See also United States v.
Union Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 955 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982) (submis-
sion of a statement to a private purchaser in connection with such purchaser's preparation of
records that ultimately influence a federal agency is sufficient); United States v. Beasley, 550
F.2d 261, 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977) (submission of a claim through a
state agency administering a federal program is sufficient).
116. See United States v. Hooper, 596 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
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Third, in order to establish a violation of section 1001, the govern-
ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statement was
made knowingly and willfully.117 This does not, however, require the
government to prove that such statement was made "with specific intent
to deceive the Federal Government."'1 18 A statement is made "know-
ingly" if it is made with knowledge or awareness of the true facts and not
prompted by mistake, accident or another innocent reason.119 Knowl-
edge can also be proven by a reckless disregard for the truthfulness of the
statement coupled with a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth.2
Finally, the government is not required to prove that a defendant had
actual knowledge that the statement would affect a matter involving the
government.' 2 ' As for the requirement that the statement be made "will-
fully," the element of willfulness is generally satisfied if the act is done
voluntarily and with the necessary intent.1
22
Finally, materiality depends on whether the statement has "a natu-
ral tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing the decision of
Kraude, 467 F.2d 37, 38 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972). According to the court
in United States v. Diaz, 690 F.2d 1352, 1357-58 (1lth Cir. 1982), there need be no regulation
requiring the retention of such records if they are otherwise material. In Ebeling v. United
States, 248 F.2d 429 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957), a contractor and a subcon-
tractor prepared a series of fictitious invoices. The contractor then issued checks to the sub-
contractor for work that was in fact not performed. A corresponding charge for the work was
subsequently included in the statement of costs submitted to the government by the contractor.
At trial, the contractor contended that the false invoices were not within the jurisdiction of a
government department or agency because they were never submitted to the government. The
court, however, concluded that it is sufficient if a person willfully makes or uses a false state-
ment in a document with the intention that the document bear some relation to a matter
within the jurisdiction of a government department or agency. Thus, under this broad inter-
pretation, government contract certifications will almost always fall within the jurisdiction of a
government department or agency. Id. at 434.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See supra text accompanying note 109.
118. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 73 (1984).
119. See United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1288 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Schreiber, 449 F. Supp. 856, 864 (W.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 843 (1979). Some courts, however, have been satisfied with a statement "fairly read"
as false. United States v. Rodgers, 624 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
917 (1981).
120. See United States v. White, 765 F.2d 1469, 1481-82 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246
(5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 280-
81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. Egenberg, 441 F.2d 441, 444
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); see also United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 454
(7th Cir. 1980) (the contractor did not sign or execute a document or know one would be filed,
but the court found it foreseeable by the contractor that the principal would deceive the United
States Customs Service).
121. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 68-70.
122. See United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 503 (1lth Cir. 1982); United States v.
Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 852-56 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973).
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the tribunal in making a determination required to be made. 1 2 3 The gov-
ernment, however, need not actually have relied on or been influenced by
the false statement.' 24 In fact, the government can establish materiality
even though it: (1) actually knew the truth; (2) never read the false state-
ment; or (3) ignored the false statement.125 Furthermore, the fact that no
actual harm occurs as a result of the statement is not determinative, since
the mere potential for harm can establish materiality. 126 Similarly, a
statement may be material even if it does not result in an economic bene-
fit to the defendant. 127
Criminal liability can also result under that part of section 1001
which subjects to punishment one who "knowingly and willfully falsifies,
conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact."'
128
Concealment requires proof of willful nondisclosure by means of a
"trick, scheme, or device."' 129 Moreover, there is case authority that the
government must prove that the defendant had the duty to disclose the
material facts at the time he was alleged to have concealed them.'30 In
addition, the "trick, scheme, or device" language requires proof of an
affirmative act by which the material facts are concealed. 3'
B. Ambiguous Statements
In United States v. Steinhilber,132 the Court of Appeals for the
123. United States v. Voorhees, 593 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936
(1979); see also United States v. Brown, 742 F.2d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1984) (submitting false
time sheets to obtain CETA funds); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359, 1362 (11th Cir.)
(filing false residency applications with the Immigration and Naturalization Service), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Hausmann, 711 F.2d 615, 616 (5th Cir. 1983)
(providing false receipts to the Small Business Administration); Blake v. United States, 323
F.2d 245, 246 (8th Cir. 1963); Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701-02 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
124. See United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
907 (1980); United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 196 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977).
125. See Diaz, 690 F.2d at 1358; United States v. McIntosh, 655 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982).
126. See United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 1984); McIntosh, 655 F.2d at 83;
United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1976).
127. See United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (8th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Cowden, 677 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1982).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1001; see Voorhees, 593 F.2d at 350.
129. Diogo, 320 F.2d at 902; see also Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096; Irwin, 654 F.2d at 678.
130. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 678-79; see also United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, 971-72
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (the court looked for a law requiring disclosure of the information).
131. United States v. London, 550 F.2d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 1977).
132. 484 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1973).
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Eighth Circuit reversed a defendant's conviction for misrepresentations
made to the Department of Housing and Urban Development because
the government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant "knowingly and willfully" made statements that were false.
In reaching its decision, the court noted that when the government's evi-
dence infers innocence just as equally as it infers guilt, the verdict must
be one of not guilty. 133 Furthermore, the court noted an ambiguity ques-
tion raised by the defendant as to whether the defendant "knowingly and
willfully" made the alleged false statements. In discussing this issue, the
court stated that:
In determining whether a statement is made with knowledge of
its falsity:
"[i]t is well established that we must look to the
meaning intended by the [defendant], rather than to
the interpretation of the statements which the... au-
thorities did in fact make, or even to the interpreta-
tions which the authorities might reasonably have
made...."
Following these principles, we hold that here the meaning
of the words in question was ambiguous and the Government
had the burden of negating the claim that the defendant "did
not know the falsity of his statement at the time it was made, or
that it was the product of an accident, honest inadvertence, or
duress." 
134
In United States v. Anderson,131 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, after determining that certain language in an invoice certification
was ambiguous, again reversed the conviction of the defendant because
the government failed to prove the falsity of the alleged statements as
well as the defendant's knowing and willful submission of such state-
ments. 136 The court held that
it was incumbent upon the government to introduce proof suffi-
133. Id. at 389.
134. Id. at 390 (citations omitted) (brackets in original) (emphasis in original); see also
United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1978) (prosecution for a false statement
cannot be based on an ambiguous statement that may be literally and factually correct).
Similarly, courts interpreting the federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982), a stat-
ute often analogized to § 1001 (see United States v. Clifford, 426 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.Y.
1976)), have concluded that "it is settled that a false statement which is the result of an honest
mistake is not perjury." United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 623 (3d Cir. 1954) (citing Sey-
mour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1935)).
135. 579 F.2d 455 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
136. Id. at 460.
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cient to establish the falsity of the statements as well as the
defendant's knowing and willful submission of the statements.
In carrying out that burden the government must negative any
reasonable interpretation that would make the defendant's
statement factually correct.
137
In United States v. Diogo,138 the classic case on allegedly false am-
biguous statements, the defendant represented to immigration authorities
that he was married to an American citizen.139 Under the law of the
state of New York, the defendant's representation was true. 140 However,
under the interpretation the immigration officials ascribed to the term
"married," the defendant's representation was false.' In reaching its
conclusion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:
In construing these statements it is well established that
we must look to the meaning intended by the appellants them-
selves, rather than to the interpretation of the statements which
137. Id. at 459-60. In this case, the defendant submitted invoices to the government con-
taining the following certification:
I CERTIFY THAT (a) the State of Arkansas-CETA, Office of the Governor has not
been billed for the services covered by this invoice; (b) funds have not been received
from the State or expended for such services under any other contract agreement or
grant; (c) the amount(s) claimed by this invoice constitute(s) allowable costs/expend-
itures under the terms of the contract agreement or grant; (d) all amounts for federal
income, unemployment, and FICA taxes due through the end of the preceeding
quarter have been paid.
Id. at 459. The circuit court specifically found that clause (b) of the certification was ambigu-
ous since a reasonable interpretation of the terms "received" and "expended" could be that
"other federal funds have actually been paid out or actually received by the county for the
work done." Here,
the federal funds had only been committed to the project but were still held by the
Arkansas State Highway Department. Furthermore, in the context of the overall
application the meaning of the phrase 'any other contract agreement or grant' is
somewhat unclear. A reasonable construction of the phrase would be that no prior
CETA funds have been expended, rather than that no funds from some other unre-
lated federal grant have been expended.
Id. at 459-60; see also United States v. Lozano, 511 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.) (the court noted its
reluctance to find a knowing false statement when the challenged assertion may be literally
true, even if false by implication or omission), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 850 (1975); United States
v. Clifford, 426 F. Supp. 696, 705 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[it is incumbent upon the Government
to negate any reasonable interpretation that would make the defendant's [ambiguous] state-
ment factually correct"). "This is not the type of case where defendant offers a contrived,
hypertechnical or lame interpretation of his answer solely for purposes of trial." Id. Thus, the
government must prove that: (1) the defendant used the words with the meaning suggested by
the government, and (2) the defendant nevertheless made a statement which he knew to be
false in the sense thus intended. Id.
138. 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963).
139. Id. at 901.
140. Id. at 905.
141. Id.
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the immigration authorities did in fact make, or even to the
interpretation which the authorities might reasonably have
made.
We do not suggest that a court must accept as conclusive
the meaning which a defendant, in a prosecution such as this,
ascribes to the words he has used. If this were the rule to be
applied, every person accused of perjury or false representa-
tions could assert his understanding of the words used in such a
way as to preclude any possibility of conviction.... Where, as
here, however, no evidence is presented on the question, it is
incumbent upon the Government to negative any reasonable in-
terpretation that would make the defendant's statement factu-
ally correct. 142
The court went on to note that, in prosecutions for false statements, the
problem of interpreting ambiguous statements is frequently merged into
the issue of mens rea.143 If a defendant did not intend by his statement to
assert the proposition which the government has proved to be false, then
he cannot ordinarily be said to have knowingly uttered a false
statement.144
In United States v. Adler,145 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit upheld the district court's refusal to give a jury instruction that
the defendant's claims, if literally true, could not support conviction and
that the government had the burden to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that an ambiguous claim was false under any reasonable interpre-
tation. 146 The district court instructed the jury, however, that if the de-
fendant "performed or reasonably believed he or someone acting at his
direction or on his behalf performed the services for which claims were
made which are the subject of this indictment [he must be found not
142. Id. at 905-07 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 906 n.6.
144. Id. See also United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114, 1120 (4th Cir. 1980). To be ambig-
uous, a contract must be susceptible of at least two reasonable constructions. When the gov-
ernment concedes that a clause is ambiguous, it necessarily concedes that the defendant's
construction of the clause, as one of a number of possible constructions, is reasonable. Such a
conclusion requires a ruling that the defendants cannot be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001
for a statement which may be said to be accurate within a reasonable construction of the
contract. Thus, whenever a defendant's statement under a contract accords with a reasonable
construction of the enabling language of the contract, the government will not have carried its
burden of negating every reasonable interpretation that would make the defendant's statement
factually correct. Id.
145. 623 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1980).
146. Id. at 1289.
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guilty]." 147 After reviewing this jury instruction, the appellate court held
that the jury was instructed in substance concerning the defendant's the-
ory of the case, i.e., that the claims were literally true or at least he be-
lieved them to be true.
148
Thus, in the defective pricing context, if the certification language-
"accurate, complete and current"-is ambiguous, a contractor would not
be liable for an allegedly false statement that was based upon a reason-
able interpretation of the certification language. In order to gain a crimi-
nal conviction for violation of section 1001, the government would have
to negate every reasonable interpretation of the phrase "accurate, com-
plete and current" that would make the contractor's construction factu-
ally correct. If the government is unable to prove that the contractor's
interpretation is either unreasonable or factually incorrect, it will also
have failed to prove the necessary intent to deceive in order to gain a
conviction under section 1001.
C. Other Applicable Criminal Statutes
1. Mail and wire fraud
While mail fraud requires the government to prove a higher stan-
dard of intent on the part of the defendant than does the crime of false
statements, the prosecution frequently uses it because of the simplicity of
the facts that must be proven to gain a conviction. Moreover, its ele-
ments lend themselves well to the prosecution's attempt to gain multiple
convictions for what is basically the same conduct. Section 1341 of 18
U.S.C. provides that:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give
away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use
any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out
to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places
in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal
Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to
147. Id. at 1290.
148. Id.
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the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to
be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both. 149
While convictions for mail fraud are more common than for wire
fraud, the reasons behind the prosecution's use of 18 U.S.C. section 1343
mirror those discussed above for mail fraud. Section 1343 of 18 U.S.C.
provides that:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.150
A conviction for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. section 1341 requires
proof that the defendant:
(1) participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud the United
States out of property, money, or credit by means of false or
fraudulent representations;
(2) used or caused the use of the mails in connection with
such scheme; and
(3) used or caused the use of the mails willfully and with the
specific intent to carry out some essential step in the execution
of said scheme or artifice to defraud.1 51
In this regard, a "scheme to defraud" requires that the defendant seek to
deprive the government of funds or services through fraudulent or decep-
tive means, such as material misrepresentation, concealment, the breach
of a duty to disclose information, or the taking of bribes or kickbacks.152
Thus, the government must prove a specific intent to defraud and show
that the alleged scheme was "reasonably calculated to deceive persons of
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
150. Id. § 1343.
151. See United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1072 (1984); United States v. Rodgers, 624 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 917 (1981).
152. United States v. Pintar, 630 F.2d 1270, 1280 (8th Cir. 1980); see also United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1251
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 926 (1975).
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ordinary prudence and comprehension." 153 Moreover, once the govern-
ment establishes willful participation in and knowledge of the scheme, a
defendant not directly connected with a particular fraudulent act is none-
theless responsible if the act was of a kind to which the parties had
agreed.15 4 In the context of defective pricing, the government will most
likely argue that the defective pricing itself constituted a scheme to de-
fraud. Such scheme involved the contractor seeking to deprive the gov-
ernment of funds by inflating the contract price through the certification
of inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent data.
The mailing does not have to be an essential element of the scheme
since it is sufficient if the mailing is incidental to an essential part of the
scheme. 155 Indeed, the government need only show that the defendant
"caused" the mailing "with knowledge that the use of the mails will fol-
low in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably
be foreseen, even though not actually intended." '56 Further, the mailing
requirement is met even if the defendant does none of the mailing, if:
(1) the defendant does an act with knowledge that use of the mails will
follow in the ordinary course of business, or (2) such use can reasonably
be foreseen even though not actually intended."7
Regarding intent, the government must establish beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud. 5 The
requisite intent may be inferred, however, from all the facts and circum-
153. United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
(1980); see also United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978).
154. See United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 856-59 (10th Cir. 1984) (a doctor's submis-
sion of false insurance claims constitutes mail fraud even though Government agents devised
the scheme and the doctor sought little profit from the scheme); Rodgers, 624 F.2d at 1308 (co-
schemers were jointly responsible for the acts of others in furtherance of the scheme); United
States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539, 545 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978)
(the defendant was held to be responsible for all of the acts within the general scope of the
scheme on which the co-schemers embarked).
155. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d at 1571.
156. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954); see also United States v. Reed, 721
F.2d 1059, 1061 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bright, 588 F.2d 504, 510 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979). Cf. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1974) (there is
no violation of § 1341 when the mails are merely used as the result of a fraudulent scheme);
United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1977) (mailings used by the defendants
as a "convenient but not essential tool" in carrying out a scheme do not satisfy the jurisdic-
tional requirements of § 1341).
157. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9; Haimowitz, 725 F.2d at 1571.
158. United States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127
(1979). See also United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976); Nance, 502
F.2d at 618.
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stances surrounding the defendant's actions.159 Unlike prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. section 1001, "knowledge" cannot be proven by a mere
reckless disregard on the part of the defendant that the mail would be
used to carry out some essential step in the execution of the scheme.
The elements of wire fraud are the same as for mail fraud, except
that the medium involved in wire fraud is "wire, radio, or television com-
munication in interstate or foreign commerce."' 160 Unlike mail fraud
which does not require the sending of something across state lines (intra-
state use of the mails is equally criminal), however, wire fraud generally
requires an interstate transmission of information.
Thus, under the above statutes, intentional misconduct by a contrac-
tor involving the mails or interstate telecommunications might be char-
acterized as mail or wire fraud. As a result of the breadth and flexibility
of these statutes and the relative ease with which the government can
establish a violation under them, government contractors must be aware
of the likelihood of prosecution for mail or wire fraud. In this regard, a
former Chief of Business Frauds Prosecutions, in the U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice for the Southern District of New York, described the mail fraud stat-
ute in the following manner: "[It is] our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our
Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love. We may flirt with
RICO, show off with lOb-5, and call the conspiracy law 'darling,' but we
always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity,
adaptability, and comfortable familiarity."'
161
2. Conspiracy
Conspiracy has been charged by prosecutors in indictments claiming
that a contractor conspired with its employees (e.g., negotiators) or with
other contractors or subcontractors to defraud the government. Section
371 of 18 U.S.C. provides that:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any of-
fense against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
159. Fuel, 583 F.2d at 983; see also United States v. Hicks, 619 F.2d 752, 755 (8th Cir.
1980); United States v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 1290, 1295 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Arnold,
543 F.2d 1224, 1225 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1051 (1977); Nance, 502 F.2d at
618.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see also United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 307 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
161. B. ELMER, J. SWENNAN & R. BEIZER, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT FRAUD 3-22
(1985).
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imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'6 2
The conspiracy statute encompasses two types of crimes-conspiracy to
violate some substantive provision of the federal criminal code (such as
18 U.S.C. section 1001), as well as conspiracy to defraud the United
States. With respect to conspiracy to defraud the United States, it is well
established that the statutory language is not confined to fraud as defined
in the common law,'63 but it reaches any conspiracy for the purpose of
impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any depart-
ment of government.164
A "conspiracy" exists where two or more persons: (1) make an
agreement; (2) to commit an offense or to defraud the United States;
(3) with knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy and with the inten-
tional and actual participation in the conspiracy; and (4) one or more of
the conspirators performs an overt act in furtherance of the illegal
goal. 165 The necessary "agreement" need not be formal or express and a
tacit understanding may be sufficient to constitute a conspiratorial agree-
ment.166 Moreover, since conspiracy is by its very nature often not sus-
162. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
163. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966). With respect to common-law
"fraud," there are nine elements that must be proven: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's "knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth"; (5) his "intent
that it should be acted on by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated"; (6) the
hearer's "ignorance of its falsity"; (7) his "reliance on its truth"; (8) his "right to rely thereon";
and (9) his "consequent and proximate injury." Schimmer v. H.W. Freeman Constr. Co., 607
S.W.2d 767, 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see also O'Shaughnessy v. Ward Aircraft Sales & Serv.,
Inc., 552 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). It is interesting to note that, while the federal
criminal statutes discussed herein evolved out of common law fraud, the government's burden
of proving criminal conduct under the enumerated fraud statutes is less than proving common
law fraud. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the government need not prove that it relied
on the defendant's statements in order to gain a conviction. Moreover, common law fraud
involves a voluntary representation/statement where the defendant elects to speak but inten-
tionally fails to speak fully so as to mislead the listener. Under the cost or pricing data regula-
tions, however, the defendant is compelled to make certain statements to the government.
Thus, the defendant should not be liable for unintentionally misleading a listener where he
involuntarily disclosed only that which the listener required him to disclose.
164. See Dennis, 384 U.S. at 861; United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 630 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 847 (1984); see also Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188
(1924); United States v. Keitel, 211 U.S. 370, 393-95 (1908).
165. See United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1940); United States v. Soto, 716
F.2d 989, 991-92 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1189 (8th Cir.
1983); Pintar, 630 F.2d at 1275; United States v. Skillman, 442 F.2d 542, 547 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971).
166. Richmond, 700 F.2d at 1190. See also United States v. McCarty, 611 F.2d 220, 222
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980); Nilva v. United States, 212 F.2d 115, 121
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 825 (1954). Some courts have found proof of a common
resolve based upon a review of the defendant's actions. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
124 (1974); Pintar, 630 F.2d at 1275.
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ceptible of proof by direct evidence, the existence of an agreement may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence or proof of prior similar activities,
including the conduct of the alleged conspirators and the circumstances
indicating their concerted action toward a common unlawful goal.
1 67
In Haas v. Henkel,6 ' the Supreme Court held that the conspiracy
statute is "broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy for the
purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any
department of Government." '16 9 Fourteen years later, Chief Justice Taft
defined the "conspire to defraud the United States" phrase in the follow-
ing manner:
To conspire to defraud the United States means primarily
to cheat the government out of property or money, but it also
means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful govern-
mental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by
means that are dishonest. It is not necessary that the govern-
ment shall be subjected to property or pecuniary loss by the
fraud, but only that its legitimate official action and purpose
shall be defeated by misrepresentation, chicane, or the over-
reaching of those charged with carrying out the governmental
intention. 170
The most wide ranging aspect of the definition of defrauding the United
States is the "obstruct or impair legitimate Government activity" stan-
dard.17 1 Proof that the government has been defrauded, however, does
not require any showing of pecuniary or proprietary loss.172 In fact, one
court has noted that section 371 requires only "mission attempted," not
167. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 124; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United
States v. Hickerson, 732 F.2d 611, 614-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 846 (1984); Rich-
mond, 700 F.2d at 1190; United States v. Moss, 591 F.2d 428, 435 (8th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978).
168. 216 U.S. 462 (1910); see also Dennis, 384 U.S. at 861; United States v. Johnson, 383
U.S. 169, 172 (1966).
169. Haas, 216 U.S. at 479-80.
170. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188.
171. See Harney v. United States, 306 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.) (diversion of federal funds from
their true and lawful object), cerL denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962); United States v. Glasser, 116
F.2d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1940) (bribery of a government official to breach a duty owed to the
government), modified, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Wallenstein v. United States, 25 F.2d 708 (3d
Cir.) (misuse of a right or privilege given by the government), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 608
(1928).
172. See Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 72 (1905); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 283
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
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"mission accomplished."'17 3
In addition, the government must generally establish that at least
one of the conspirators took some "overt act" in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.174 In the case of defective pricing, such an act can arguably be
established by the submission of inaccurate, incomplete and noncurrent
cost or pricing data as part of an overall scheme to defraud the govern-
ment into paying an inflated contract price. Moreover, the subsequent
submission of claims for payment, based on an inflated contract price
resulting from defective pricing, can also be viewed as a further overt act.
The Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits, perceiving a
liberal trend in Supreme Court decisions with respect to proof require-
ments for conspiracy charges, have upheld conspiracy to defraud convic-
tions even where no deceit, trickery or dishonest means have been
charged. 175 Other circuits, however, have interpreted recent Supreme
Court decisions as reaffirming the deceit or trickery requirement. 176
Once the existence of a conspiracy is shown, even slight evidence
connecting a particular individual to a conspiracy may be sufficient to
sustain a conspiracy conviction. 177 Moreover, the government need not
prove that the alleged conspirators had knowledge of every detail or
phase of the conspiracy. 7 8 However, neither mere association with indi-
viduals engaged in illegal conduct nor mere knowledge of the existence
or acquiescence in the object of a conspiracy is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. 179 Instead, there must exist some element of "affirmative co-
operation or at least an agreement to cooperate in the object of the con-
spiracy," 180 but a conscious avoidance of knowledge may not shield a
defendant from conspiratorial involvement.181 Once an individual has
entered into a conspiracy, he may be able to escape liability for future
173. United States v. Root, 366 F.2d 377, 383 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912
(1967); see also Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1968).
174. United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1051;
United States v. Kupper, 693 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Conlon, 481 F. Supp.
654 (D.D.C. 1979).
175. See United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 963-64 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Porter, 591 F.2d 1048, 1055 (5th Cir. 1979).
176. See Pintar, 630 F.2d at 1277-79; Peltz, 433 F.2d at 51-52.
177. Richmond, 700 F.2d at 1190.
178. McCarty, 611 F.2d at 222-23; Fuel, 583 F.2d at 981.
179. United States v. Wrehe, 628 F.2d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brown,
584 F.2d 252, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979).
180. Brown, 584 F.2d at 262 (quoting United States v. Collins, 552 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir.),
cert denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979)).
181. United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991
(1982); cf. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699-704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951
(1976) (evidence of conscious avoidance is merely circumstantial evidence of knowledge).
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acts of the conspiracy by withdrawing from the conspiracy. In order to
constitute a bona fide withdrawal from the conspiracy, however, he must
generally take some affirmative action inconsistent with the object of the
conspiracy or communicate his withdrawal in a manner reasonably cal-
culated to reach his co-conspirators.
18 2
With regard to corporations, it is well settled that corporations can
be convicted of criminal violations, including conspiracy. 183 However, a
corporation and an unincorporated division of that corporation cannot
be guilty of conspiring with each other.1 4 While courts have tradition-
ally held that officers and employees of a corporation are uhable to con-
spire with the corporation since they are in actuality its agents, a few
courts are beginning to uphold convictions of corporations for conspiring
with their own employees to commit an offense or to defraud the
government.'"8
3. False claims
The crime of false claims is used by the government to prosecute
conduct that goes beyond mere false statements.'86 Here, unlike false
statements, the government must prove that: (1) there was a claim upon
the government for money or property, 87 and (2) the claim was actually
presented. 8 8 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. section 287 provides that:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the
182. United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1982).
183. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1939); United States v. Ameri-
can Grain & Related Indus., 763 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d
961 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); United States v. Consolidated Coal
Co., 424 F. Supp. 577 (D. Ohio 1976).
184. Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 156 F. Supp. 76 (W.D.
Pa. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958).
185. See American Grain, 763 F.2d at 320; United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1007-08
(1st Cir. 1984); United States v. S & Vee Cartage Co., 704 F.2d 914, 920 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 972 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
186. See 18 U.S.C. § 286 (1982), which provides that:
Whoever enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the
United States, or any department or agency thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain
the payment or allowance of any false, fictitious or fraudulent claim, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Id.
187. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968) (the False Claims Act reaches
beyond claims which might be legally enforced to all fraudulent attempts to cause the govern-
ment to pay out sums of money); McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (the conception of a claim against the
government under the False Claims Act, normally connotes a demand for money or for some
transfer of public property).
188. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1953); see also United
States v. Rainwater, 244 F.2d 27, 28 (8th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 356 U.S. 590 (1958).
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civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or to any
department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the
United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing
such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.1
89
In order for the government to establish the offense of "false, fictitious or
fraudulent" claims, it must prove each of the following elements: (1) that
the defendant knowingly and willfully made or presented a claim' 90 to a
government agency;' 9' (2) that such claim was false, fictitious, or fraudu-
lent; and (3) that the defendant knew that such claim was false, fictitious,
or fraudulent.1
92
Initially, the government must establish the existence of a "claim."
The Supreme Court has held that the definition of "claim" reaches be-
yond claims which might be legally enforced to all fraudulent attempts to
cause the government to pay out sums of money.193 As a result, the term
"claim" can arguably include false statements contained in a contractor's
certification of its cost or pricing data. The government might support
such an allegation by reasoning that the contractor's false certification
constitutes a fraudulent attempt to cause the government to pay an in-
flated contract price. Moreover, courts have not required the govern-
ment to prove any actual injuries stemming from the false factual
information.
194
While the second element of the offense-"the presentation of such
claim to a department or agency of the government"-requires more
than a mere plan to make a claim, it has been broadly construed by the
courts. 195 While more than a mere intent to make a claim must be shown
189. 18 U.S.C. § 287.
190. A claim is generally defined as an attempt to secure money or property from the
United States Treasury. Neifert- White Co., 390 U.S. at 233; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-42.181 (1977) [hereinafter ATTORNEY'S MAN-
UAL].
191. "Government agency" has been broadly interpreted to include the executive branch,
the judicial branch, the legislative branch, independent government agencies, and wholly-
owned government corporations. McNinch, 356 U.S. at 598; Rainwater v. United States, 356
U.S. 590, 591-92 (1958); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955); United States v.
Michener, 152 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1945); United States v. MacEvoy, 58 F. Supp. 83, 86-87
(D.N.J. 1944).
192. United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 596 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Com-
puter Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (E.D.Va. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689
F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
193. Hess, 317 U.S. at 542.
194. See United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
195. See United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1978);
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in order to satisfy the "making or presenting" element, there is no re-
quirement that the claim actually be honored.1 96 In United States v.
Blecker, 197 a subcontractor was convicted for submitting invoices to the
prime contractor based on falsified resumes that inflated the compensa-
tion due under the contract. Although there was no contract between
the government and the subcontractor and the claim was actually
presented to the government by the prime contractor, the court found
that the subcontractor had submitted false claims to the government be-
cause he had knowledge that the prime contractor would transmit simi-
larly inflated invoices. 9 ' A defendant will not be liable under section
287 unless he presents his claim "knowing such claim to be false, ficti-
tious or fraudulent." Courts, however, have disagreed on the intent nec-
essary to constitute a "knowing" presentation of a false claim under
section 287. Some courts define the requisite state of mind as "knowl-
edge of falsity," '199 while others require a specific intent to deceive.2
Finally, several courts have held that knowledge can be inferred from a
reckless disregard for the truth of the claim coupled with a conscious
purpose to avoid learning the truth.20 1 Furthermore, while "willfulness"
does not appear in section 287, the standard of willfulness is frequently
required by the courts in section 287 indictments and jury
instructions.2 °2
United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863 (1977); United
States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974).
196. See Coachman, 727 F.2d at 1302; United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1212 n.10
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977); United States v. Lopez, 420 F.2d 313, 315
(2d Cir. 1969); see also ATroRNEY'S MANUAL § 9-42.181 (1977).
197. 657 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982).
198. Id. at 634; see also United States v. Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340, 1344 (10th Cir. 1983) (a
defendant's awareness that the funds ultimately would be provided by a federal agency is irrel-
evant); Precision Medical Laboratories, 593 F.2d at 442-43; Beasley, 550 F.2d at 271-73 (18
U.S.C. § 287 covers claims submitted to the state where the claimant "knew the state would
rely on the claims for reimbursement from the government"); Catena, 500 F.2d at 1321-22
(doctors violated 18 U.S.C. § 287 by submitting false claims to insurance carriers which then
submitted such claims to the government for reimbursement); United States v. Jacobson, 467
F. Supp. 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (payment by a state agency, which is partially funded by
the government, is a claim against the United States).
199. Precision Medical Laboratories, 593 F.2d at 443.
200. United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1978) (a jury may infer an intent
to defraud if it finds that the defendant knew his claim was false).
201. See United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 821-22 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1217 (1985); United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S.
1021 (1984); United States v. Cook, 586 F.2d 572, 578-80 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 442
U.S. 909 (1979)..
202. See United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979) (approved jury
instruction on knowing and willful element in indictment); Precision Medical Laboratories, 593
F.2d at 444 (words "willfully" and "unlawfully" in indictment did not lower the government's
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Courts have also disagreed over whether a materiality requirement
should be applied to section 287. On the one hand, the Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have concluded that materiality
of the alleged false claim must be proven.2 °3 However, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has held that the question of materiality is a matter
of law.2" On the other hand, the Courts of Appeals for the Second and
the Tenth Circuits have refused to adopt materiality as an element of a
section 287 violation.20 5
In Johnson v. United States, 20 6 the contractor submitted a claim con-
taining an implied misrepresentation of compliance under a government
contract. The contractor argued that "his submission amounted to noth-
ing more than a statement that according to his understanding of the
contract between him and the Government, he was entitled to receive a
payment. ' 20 7 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argu-
ment and held that the claim was false.2 08
In Imperial Meat Co. v. United States,20 9 the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that delivery of goods to the government at qual-
ity levels below contract specifications constituted a false claim.210 The
contractor argued that the invoices did not represent the goods to be of
any particular quality.211 The court, however, found sufficient reference
in the invoices to the contract documents to establish a false claim.212
4. Aiding and abetting
In the event that the government is unable to establish the requisite
elements of any of the above criminal offenses, a contractor might still be
criminally liable for aiding and abetting the commission of any such of-
fense. Section 2 of 18 U.S.C. provides that:
burden of proof); United States v. Maher, 582 F.2d 842, 84647 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (approved jury instruction on willfulness).
203. See United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 n.12 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Johnson, 410 F.2d 38, 46 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1969).
204. United States v. Pruitt, 702 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1983).
205. See United States v. Elldn, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 822
(1984); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982).
206. 410 F.2d 38, 41-44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1969).
207. Id. at 44.
208. Id. at 44-45.
209. 316 F.2d 435 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820 (1963).
210. Id. at 439-40.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 440.
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(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if
directly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States, is punishable as a principal.213
In order to gain a conviction under section 2, the government must estab-
lish that the defendant aided or abetted the principal to violate the predi-
cate criminal statute (e.g., 18 U.S.C. section 1001).214 For example,
conduct on the part of the defendant amounting to counseling or other
assistance in the prohibited activity might be sufficient if proven.215
However, there must be some proof of "affirmative participation which
at least encouraged the perpetrators. 216
D. Monetary Penalties
The monetary penalties contained in the above statutes apply to all
offenses committed before December 31, 1984. For offenses committed
after December 31, 1984, 18 U.S.C. section 3623 provides that an indi-
vidual may be fined not more than the greatest of:
(1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the
offense;
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (c) of this
section;
(3) in the case of a felony, $250,000;
(4) in the case of a misdemeanor resulting in death,
$250,000; or
(5) in the case of a misdemeanor punishable by imprison-
ment for more than six months, $100,000.217
A corporation or other business entity may be fined in a similar manner,
except that the maximum fine for a felony or a misdemeanor resulting in
death is $500,000.218 However, if the defendant derives pecuniary gain
from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to another
213. 18 U.S.C. § 2.
214. United States v. Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 193 (6th Cir. 1983); Logsdon v. United States,
253 F.2d 12, 14 (6th Cir. 1958).
215. Grimes v. United States, 379 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 389 U.S. 846
(1967).
216. United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1195 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting United
States v. Thomas, 469 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1972)), cerL denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977).
217. See Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, § 6(a), 98 Stat. 3134
(1984).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 3623(b) (Supp. III 1985).
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person, the defendant may be fined up to twice the gross gain or twice the
gross loss, unless the imposition of such a fine would unduly complicate
or prolong the sentencing process. 219 Moreover, the maximum aggregate
fine "that a court may impose on a defendant at the same time for differ-
ent offenses that arise from a common scheme or plan, and that do not
cause separable or distinguishable kinds of harm or damage, is twice the
amount imposable for the most serious offense."
220
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,221 the above section 3623
was repealed effective November 1, 1986. Under this act, 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 3571 will apply to all offenses committed on or after November 1,
1986.222 Section 3571(b) provides that an individual may be fined:
(A) for a felony, or for a misdemeanor resulting in the
loss of human life, not more than $250,000;
(B) for any other misdemeanor, not more than $25,000;
and
(C) for an infraction, not more than $1000.223
A corporation or other business entity may be fined not more than
$500,000, $100,000 or $10,000, respectively.
22 4
E. Statute of Limitations
Section 3282 of 18 U.S.C. provides that: "Except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished
for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the infor-
mation is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have
been committed. ' 225 All of the above statutes proscribe different illegal
conduct subject to the same five-year statute of limitations applicable to
non-capital felonies. Frequently, the government has been able to effec-
tively lengthen the five-year statute of limitations under the "last act"
theory. For example, because conspiracy is a continuing offense, the stat-
ute of limitations for conspiracy runs from the date of the last overt act
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.226 Thus, if at least one overt
act is shown to have occurred within the statute of limitations, evidence
219. Id. § 3623(c)(1).
220. Id. § 3623(c)(2).
221. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 202(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
222. Id. § 225.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(1) (1982).
224. Id. § 3571(b)(2).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982).
226. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-99 (1957); United States v. Payne,
635 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981); United States v. Rubin,
609 F.2d 51, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); United States v. Parker, 586
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of a conspiracy agreement and other overt acts committed outside the
limitations period may be admitted as proof of an ongoing conspiracy.
2 27
Accordingly, if the government establishes that a contractor con-
spired to submit a false certification to defraud the government into pay-
ing on an inflated contract price, the government would have five years
from the contractor's submission of the last claim for payment to bring
an indictment. On multi-year contracts, the government could therefore
challenge the certification's validity more than five years after it was
submitted.
V. SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT
In light of the government's campaign against procurement fraud,
there has been increasing pressure for "more aggressive" use of the gov-
ernment's suspension and debarment powers.228 The government's pro-
curement regulations set forth the procedures for suspending or
debarring a contractor229 from bidding on, being awarded or participat-
ing in contracts or related subcontracts with the government.23 ° Under
these regulations, an indictment231 for fraud or other criminal offenses
which involve obtaining, attempting to obtain or performing a public
contract may be grounds for suspension until the matter is resolved.232
Subsequent conviction233 for fraud or other criminal offenses may result
in debarment. Suspension and debarment are discretionary actions to
effectuate the government's policy of dealing only with "responsible con-
F.2d 422, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979); United States v. Charnay,
537 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
227. See United States v. Romano, 516 F.2d 768, 771 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994
(1975); United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 684-85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947
(1964); Imholte v. United States, 226 F.2d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 1955); United States v. Lena, 497
F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1981).
228. See, eg., SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T. MGMT., SENATE COMM. ON Gov'TL
AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON REFORM OF GOVERNMENT-WIDE DEBAR-
MENT AND SUSPENSION PROCEDURES (Comm. Print 1981).
229. A "contractor" is "any individual or other legal entity that (a) submits offers for or is
awarded, or reasonably may be expected to submit offers for or be awarded, a Government
contract or a subcontract under a Government contract or (b) conducts business with the
Government as an agent or representative of another contractor." FAR § 9.403.
230. See Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter No. 82-1, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,857
(1982).
231. The term "indictment" refers to an "indictment for a criminal offense. An information
or other filing by competent authority charging a criminal offense shall be given the same effect
as an indictment." FAR § 9.403.
232. Id. § 9.407-2(b).
233. A "conviction" means "a judgment or conviction of a criminal offense by any court of
competent jurisdiction, whether entered upon a verdict or a plea, and includes a conviction
entered upon a plea of nolo contendere." Id. § 9.403.
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tractors.'234 They are to be imposed "only in the public interest for the
government's protection and not for purposes of punishment."23 As a
result, suspension and debarment actions are subject to judicial review.
2 36
A. Suspension
A contractor may be suspended if there is adequate evidence of:
(1) Commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connec-
tion with (i) obtaining, (ii) attempting to obtain, or (iii) per-
forming a public contract or subcontract;
(2) Violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes relat-
ing to the submission of offers;
(3) Commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery,
falsification or destruction of records, making false statements,
or receiving stolen property; or
(4) Commission of any other offense indicating a lack of
business integrity or business honesty that seriously and di-
rectly affects the present responsibility of a Government con-
tractor or subcontractor.23 v
Moreover, indictment for any of the above causes constitutes "adequate
evidence for suspension. ' 238 If suspension is not based on an indictment,
the contractor may, under certain circumstances, have an opportunity to
develop a record as to material facts over which there is a genuine dis-
pute.239 However, no such opportunity will be provided if the Justice
Department determines that "substantial interests of the Government in
pending or contemplated legal proceedings based on the same facts as the
suspension would be prejudiced.
' '24°
If suspended, the contractor and any affiliates shall receive prompt
notice by certified mail: (1) that they have been suspended; (2) that the
suspension is for a temporary period pending the completion of an inves-
tigation and any subsequent legal proceeding; (3) of the reasons for im-
posing the suspension; (4) of the effect of the suspension; (5) that, within
thirty days after receipt of the notice, the contractor may submit objec-
tions to the suspension raising a genuine dispute over the material facts;
234. Id. § 9.402(a).
235. Id. § 9.402(b); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Roemer v.
Hoffmann, 419 F. Supp. 130, 131 (D.D.C. 1976).
236. Gonzalez, 334 F.2d at 576.
237. FAR § 9.407-2(a).
238. Id. § 9.407-2(b).
239. Id. § 9.407-3(b)(2).
240. Id.
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and (6) that proceedings to determine disputed material facts will be con-
ducted unless (i) the action is based on an indictment or (ii) the Justice
Department advises that substantial governmental interests in pending or
contemplated legal proceedings would be prejudiced. 41 In the event
proceedings to determine disputed material facts are conducted, the
suspending officer's 242 decision must be "based on all the information in
the administrative record, including any submission made by the
contractor.
243
If legal proceedings are not initiated within twelve months after the
date of the suspension notice the suspension must be terminated unless
extended for an additional six months at the request of an Assistant At-
torney General. 2 " In no case may a suspension extend beyond eighteen
months, unless legal proceedings have been initiated.245 However, the
suspending officer may terminate the suspension prior to the expiration
of twelve months.246
As a result, if a government contractor that relies on new govern-
ment business for its continued economic survival is suspended, it may be
out of business. Thus, in order to end a suspension, a contractor may be
willing to plead guilty to crimes it did not commit in return for the gov-
ernment's assurance that the suspension will be lifted and the contractor
will not be debarred.
B. Debarment
Under the FAR, a contractor may be debarred for, among other
things, conviction of or civil judgment for the same reasons justifying
such contractor's suspension.247 However, the existence of a cause for
debarment "does not necessarily require that the contractor be debarred;
241. Id. § 9.407-3(c); see also Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631
F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Home Bros. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (due process
requires, in the case of a suspension, notice and an opportunity to be heard).
242. The "debarring" or "suspending" official who is empowered to take action under Sub-
part 9.4 of the FAR, is either the agency head or authorized representative of the agency head.
FAR § 9.403. The Department of Defense authorized representatives are identified in DOD
FAR Supplement, 48 C.F.R. § 9.470 (1984).
243. FAR § 9.407-3(d)(1). As with debarment, disputed issues of material fact may be re-
ferred to another official for the purposes of hearing evidence and argument and of preparing
written findings of facts, which shall be binding absent a determination by the suspending
official that the findings are "arbitrary and capricious or clearly erroneous." Id. § 9.407-
3(d)(2).
244. Id. § 9.407-4(b).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 9.407-4(a).
247. FAR § 9.406-2(a). See supra text accompanying note 237 for the list of reasons justify-
ing suspension.
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the seriousness of the contractor's acts or omissions and any mitigating
factors should be considered in making any debarment decision." '248
If one of the above causes of debarment occurs, the debarring
agency will initiate debarment by advising the contractor or subcontrac-
tor, and any specifically named "affiliates," '249 by certified mail:
(1) of the reasons for the proposed debarment; (2) of the agency's
procedures governing debarment decisionmaking, including the contrac-
tor's right to submit objections raising a genuine dispute over material
facts; (3) of the potential effect of the proposed debarment; and (4) if not
previously suspended, that the agency will treat the contractor as if it was
suspended.250
If the debarment action is based on a criminal conviction or civil
judgment, or if there is no dispute over material facts, "the debarring
official shall make a decision on the basis of all the information in the
administrative record, including any submission made by the contrac-
tor.'251 If no suspension is in effect, the debarring official must make his
decision "within 30 working days after receipt of any information and
argument submitted by the contractor, unless the debarring official ex-
tends this period for good cause. '252 If the debarring official imposes
debarment, the contractor and any affiliates will receive prompt notice by
certified mail of the debarment. "[T]he debarment is effective through-
out the executive branch of the Government unless the head of an acquir-
ing agency or a designee' 253 states in writing "the compelling reasons
justifying continued business dealings between that agency and the
contractor."
254
If the proposed debarment is not based upon a criminal conviction
or civil judgment, "the cause for debarment must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence."2 5 In such cases, if the contractor's sub-
248. FAR § 9.406-1(a) (emphasis in original). It should be noted that while FAR
§ 9.402(a) provides that debarment and suspension are discretionary actions, the court in Gon-
zalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964), held that the "determination to debar a
contractor does not fall within the scope of the second [APA] exception, 'agency action.., by
law committed to agency discretion.'" Id. at 575.
249. "Business concerns or individuals are affiliates if, directly or indirectly, (a) either one
controls or can control the other or (b) a third controls or can control both." FAR § 9.403.
250. Id. § 9.406-3(c); see also Gonzalez, 334 F.2d at 578 (due process requires, in the case of
a debarment, notice of the specific charges and "an opportunity to present evidence and to
cross-examine witnesses, all culminating in administrative findings and conclusions based upon
the record so made").
251. FAR § 9.406-3(d)(1).
252. Id.
253. Id. § 9.406-3(e)(iv).
254. Id. § 9.406-1(c).
255. Id. § 9.406-3(d)(3).
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mission in opposition to debarment raises a genuine dispute over material
facts, the contractor, with counsel, may be allowed to "submit documen-
tary evidence, present witnesses, and confront any person the agency
presents. ' 25 6 Following such proceeding, the presiding official must pre-
pare written findings of fact regarding the disputed facts.257 However,
the debarring official "may reject any such findings, in whole or in part,
only after specifically determining them to be arbitrary and capricious or
clearly erroneous."25
In applying the above administrative procedures, the following lan-
guage of Judge Sirica is particularly pertinent:
The starting point for determining whether a person
should be debarred must be the statement of Chief Justice Bur-
ger when he was a judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit:
Disqualification from bidding or contracting ... directs
the power and prestige of Government at a particular per-
son and ... may have a serious economic impact on that
person.
[Here] the plaintiff has suggested a number of factors
which appear to diminish the force of that conviction as an in-
dication of Roemer's present responsibility. These factors
touch on Roemer's character before the offense occurred, the
circumstances surrounding the offense, the deterrent effects of
the prior 29-month suspension, of the conviction, and of the
payment to the government of $3,600 in restitution, the length
of time which has passed since the offense and since the convic-
tion, and Roemer's character since the offense and conviction.
It is clear from the memorandum that Coggins wrote at
about the time he issued the order debarring Roemer that he
Was aware of at least the most important of these factors. But
what is less clear is why Coggins attributed little or no impor-
tance to them, and what it was about the offense which necessi-
tates, despite these factors, a debarment of three years. The
Court must have specific answers to these questions if it is to
exercise properly its limited review of the substance of the ad-
256. Id. § 9.406-3(b)(2)(i).
257. Id. § 9.406-3(d)(2)(i).
258. Id. § 9.406-3(d)(2)(ii).
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ministrative decision.25 9
The length of the debarment is for a period commensurate with the
seriousness of the cause for debarment.260 The Department of Defense
FAR Supplement states that the debarment period should afford ade-
quate time for the contractor to correct those problems that led to its
conviction.261 Any mitigating factors may be considered in making the
debarment decision. 262 However, "for any decision not to debar or to
debar for one year or less, the mitigating factors must demonstrate
clearly to the debarring official's complete satisfaction, that the contrac-
tor has eliminated such circumstances and has implemented effective re-
medial measures. ' '2 63  The FAR indicates that a debarment should
generally not exceed three years. 2' 6 Moreover, any period of suspension
preceding the debarment will be considered in determining the debar-
ment period.265
The fraudulent, criminal or other seriously improper conduct of any
individual associated with the contractor may be imputed to the contrac-
tor when the conduct occurred in connection with the individual's per-
formance of duties for or on behalf of the contractor, or with the
contractor's knowledge, approval, or acquiescence.2 66 Similarly, the con-
259. Roemer v. Hoffmann, 419 F. Supp. 130, 131-32 (D.D.C. 1976) (quoting Gonzalez v.
Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578 (1964)).
260. FAR § 9.406-4(a).
261. DOD FAR Supp. § 9.406-1(d).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. FAR § 9.406-4(a). The debarring official may extend the debarment period, if he de-
termines that an extension is "necessary to protect the Government's interest." Id. § 9.406-
4(b). However, such extension may not be based solely on the facts and circumstances upon
which the initial debarment action was based. Id. The debarment period may also be reduced,
"upon the contractor's request, supported by documentation, for reasons such as: "(1) Newly
discovered material evidence; (2) Reversal of the conviction or judgment upon which the de-
barment was based; (3) Bona fide change in ownership or management; (4) Elimination of
other causes for which the debarment was imposed; or (5) Other reasons the debarring official
deems appropriate." Id. § 9.406-4(c).
265. Id § 9.406-4(a).
266. Id. § 9.406-5(a). Furthermore, the FAR provides that "[t]he contractor's acceptance
of the benefits derived from the conduct shall be evidence of such knowledge, approval, or
acquiescence." Id. For example, in one board of contract appeals case, a contractor chal-
lenged the government's right to suspend it based upon the conviction of one of its employees
for conspiracy and extortion. The contractor argued that its employee's wrongful acts could
not be imputed to it and that, in any event, the employee had been terminated and there was
no evidence of subsequent improper conduct by the contractor. In rejecting the contractor's
defense, the board noted that: "(1) there was no evidence that the contractor's management
was insulated from the employee's illicit activities; (2) the employee was acting within the
scope of his authority; and (3) his wrongful actions were designed to benefit the company and
did, in fact, benefit the company." Given these facts, the board decided that the employee's
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duct of the contractor may be imputed to any individual associated with
him and the conduct of one contractor participating in a joint venture or
similar arrangement with another participating contractor.
267
C. Effect of Suspension and/or Debarment
Agencies are prohibited from soliciting offers from, or awarding
contracts to, or consenting to subcontracts with suspended or debarred
contractors, unless the head of the agency determines that there is a com-
pelling reason to do so.268 In this regard, the suspension or debarment
applies to "all divisions or other organizational elements of the contrac-
tor, unless the debarment decision is limited by its terms to specific divi-
sions, organizational elements, or commodities.
2 69
Despite debarment or suspension, agencies may continue existing
contracts or subcontracts, unless the agency head determines otherwise
"after review by agency contracting and technical personnel and by
counsel to ensure the propriety of the proposed [termination] action.
'27 0
However, agencies cannot renew or extend such contracts or subcon-
tracts, with suspended or debarred contractors, "unless the acquiring
agency's head or a designee states in writing the compelling reasons for
renewal or extension.
271
VI. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
With regard to defective pricing, a contractor's best defense to both
criminal and civil liability is to submit to the government all factual data
relating to the negotiations. If the contractor has any doubt as to
whether particular data should be submitted to the government, the saf-
est approach is to resolve all such doubts in favor of its submission. Any
disadvantage from such broad disclosure can be minimized by distin-
guishing such data during negotiations and by taking a firm position vis-
a-vis the contractor's proposed cost elements during negotiations.
Furthermore, contractors should institute review procedures to en-
sure that the most accurate, complete and current cost or pricing data
has been submitted to the government prior to the close of negotiations
actions could be the basis for the government's suspension of the company from contracting
with the government, even though there was no evidence of any subsequent misconduct by the
contractor.
267. Id. § 9.406-5(b)-(c).
268. FAR § 9.405(a).
269. Id. § 9.406-1(b).
270. Id. § 9.405-1(a).
271. Id. § 9.405-1(b).
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and certification. In the long run, a delay in concluding negotiations in
order to allow the submission of more accurate, complete and current
cost or pricing data may minimize the possibility of future civil and crim-
inal liability. Even assuming that the government is unable to obtain a
criminal conviction for the alleged defective pricing, the economic conse-
quences of a grand jury investigation and of a possible suspension greatly
outweigh the cost of implementing a more comprehensive review
procedure.
In the event the contractor discovers after the close of negotiations
that the most accurate, complete and current cost or pricing data was not
submitted to the government, it should seriously consider the post-certifi-
cation submittal of such data. Arguably, for those contractors adopting
the "Defense Industry Initiatives on Business Ethics and Conduct,
272
such disclosure is ethically required. In any case, the voluntary disclo-
sure of such information, while possibly resulting in a contract price ad-
justment in favor of the government, may support a contractor's defense
to criminal charges that it lacked the requisite intent. Similarly, a deci-
sion not to disclose such information may enhance the government's ar-
gument that the contractor intended to deceive or defraud the
government into paying an inflated contract price.
VII. CONCLUSION
Contractors seeking to do business with the government must be
especially wary of the perils of defective pricing. Under the above crimi-
nal provisions, the Justice Department may be able to seek multiple in-
dictments for the same defective pricing conduct. Submission of a false
certification to the government may constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 1001. The later submission of claims for payment, under such
272. The "Defense Industry Initiatives on Business Ethics and Conduct" were adopted by a
number of major defense contractors in order to create an environment in which compliance
with federal procurement laws and free, open and timely reporting of violations become the
responsibility of individual employees in the defense industry. In order to accomplish these
objectives, the Initiatives require adherence to a set of six principles of business ethics and
conduct. The first, second and third principles require a written code of business ethics and
conduct, training of employees in their ethical obligations, and an opportunity to report sus-
pected violations of the code without fear of retribution. The fourth principle requires contrac-
tors to voluntarily report violations of federal procurement laws to the appropriate government
authorities. Thus, while employees are responsible for reporting suspected violations to the
contractor, it is the contractor's responsibility, if an investigation determines that a violation
has occurred, to notify the appropriate governmental authorities and to institute any necessary
corrective action. Finally, the fifth and sixth principles provide for the establishment of both
an annual intercompany forum to discuss ways to implement the industry's principles of ac-
countability and an external, independent review of each contractor's adherence to these six
principles.
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contract, may constitute false claims for money under 18 U.S.C. section
287. The Justice Department may also be able to allege a conspiracy
under 18 U.S.C. section 371 on the basis that the claims being submitted
are part of a contractor's scheme to defraud the government into paying
an inflated contract price. If the contractor transmits its certification or
contract claims by mail or wire, it could also be charged with mail or
wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. sections 1341 or 1343. Finally, civil provi-
sions of the False Claim Act (31 U.S.C. section 3729) may also apply to
what in essence amounts to inadvertent defective pricing.
While public outrage over a $7600 coffeemaker has caused Congress
and the American public to closely examine the government contracting
process, such scrutiny still does not warrant the use of criminal sanctions
for what are otherwise civil violations. This is not to say that a contrac-
tor who intentionally sets out to defraud the government should not be
criminally prosecuted. However, a contractor's innocent failure to sub-
mit the most accurate, complete and current cost or pricing data should
not be allowed to form the basis for a criminal prosecution.
If the government remains determined to criminalize the con-
tracting process, this will only further increase the cost of the products it
buys. As contractors attempt to ensure the propriety of their actions,
they will be forced to implement more costly administrative controls on
their operation. The cost of such increased controls will be passed on to
the government as overhead expenses. Thus, notwithstanding that such
controls may result in some savings to the government, the savings may
well be outweighed by overhead costs associated with the new
micromanagement control mechanisms.
As discussed above, an excellent and cost effective mechanism for
resolving contract claims now exists. If the government is found to have
been overcharged by a contractor, it is entitled to recover any or all
amounts that it overpaid. In the meantime, the system recognizes that
contractors not only make mistakes with overpricing the contract, but
also routinely make mistakes in underpricing the contract. As a result,
the system currently allows a contractor to offset the amount the govern-
ment claims it overpaid by the amount the contractor can prove the gov-
ernment underpaid. Under the Justice Department's approach, however,
a contractor may be guilty of a criminal violation even if the inaccurate,
incomplete or noncurrent data resulted in the underpricing of the
contract.
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